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The importance of inheritance rights consequent to adoptions as well
as the incompleteness of present statutory provisions relating thereto is
emphasized anew by the recent North Carolina case of Wilson v. Ander-
son.1 There the question was whether plaintiff, adopted in North
Carolina in 1919, was an heir at law and/or next of kin of the intestate
brother (who died October 3, 1949) of her predeceased adoptive father
(who died March 23, 1943) along with the natural blood heirs and next
of kin of said decedent. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the new rules of descent 2 and distribution3 were not available to the
plaintiff adopted child, who was adopted in 1919 under the then effective
adoption statute4 and that therefore the plaintiff adoptee was not an
heir nor a next of kin of the intestate decedent.
PREFATORY COMMENTS
The adoption of children has become an increasingly frequent occur-
rence on the contemporary American scene. Each year more and more
childless couples are adopting children.5 In addition to many other
sources of supply such as children of relatives and of financially unfor-
tunate friends, there is an abundant supply of children to be adopted
from the numerous ranks of those of illegitimate birth. Other than the
obvious and tremendously important human, social, economic and re-
ligious aspects of adoptions, the changes in and creation of new legal
rights and duties consequent to adoptions are of far-reaching legal sig-
nificance. This is particularly true as to inheritance rights consequent
to adoptions.
There has been a great deal of loose talk and writing in recent years
about all phases of adoptions by uninformed persons. Many laymen
(unfortunately including some adoptive parents) fail to understand
properly the real nature and historical background of adoption. Par-
ticularly alarming is the frequent contemporary oversight of the fact
* Member of the Charlotte, North Carolina Bar.
3 232 N. C. 213, 59 S. E. 2d 836, petition for rehearing dismissed, 232 N. C.
521, 61 S. E. 2d 447 (1950).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(14) (1950).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §28-149(10) (1950).
'N. C. CoNs. STAT. c. 2, §185 (1905).
'In Mecklenburg County, N. C., for example, the records of the Clerk of the
Superior Court show over 100 petitions for adoptions filed in the first 11 months
of 1950.
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that every adoption is made possible, and its validity and effects for all
purposes determined solely and exclusively, by adoption statutes. Hence
it is of the utmost practical importance to the practicing attorney and
others dealing frequently with adoptions that the statutory basis and
historical background of adoptions always be kept in the mental
forefront.
HISTORY AND PURPOSE
The history of adoptions stretches back to a distant age.0 Adoptions
had a place in the law of many early civilized peoples. The ancient
Babylonians recognized adoptions over four thousand years ago.7 Adop-
tion was also recognized by the Romans, the Athenians, the Spartans,
and the Egyptians.8 It was recognized by the Hebrews in the New
Testament9 and by the ancient Germanic people. From the Spanish
law it was incorporated into the French Code Napoleon and from that
code into the laws of Texas and Louisiana.10
Adoption in early civilizations seems to have been based primarily
on either religious considerations or on the desire to provide an heir for
a childless father." On the other hand the modern English and most of
the American statutes seem to have as their dominant purpose the pro-
viding of a home, loving care, and proper upbringing by new legal adop-
tive parents, for an unfortunate child. The English and American
statutes have grown and developed primarily out of legislative concern
for the interests of the unfortunate child. This legislative concern in
turn reflected the growing social consciousness of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries and recognition of the commonwealth's responsibility
to provide for unfortunate children in the most effective manner by
allowing them to gain a permanent status in a real home with new legal
parents. For example, the 1949 Adoption Act in North Carolina de-
clares as a matter of legislative policy with respect to adoption that:
"(1) The primary purpose of this Chapter is to protect children
from unnecessary separation from parents who might give them
good homes and loving care, to protect them from adoption by
persons unfit to have the responsibility of their care and rearing,
and to protect them from interference, long after they have be-
come properly adjusted in their adoptive homes, by natural par-
ents who may have some legal claim because of a defect in the
adoption procedure.
' Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585 (1906) (extensive historical
summary of adoptions contained herein).
" Code of Hammurabi §§185-193 (compiled from 2285 to 2242 B.C.).8 ExoDus 2:10; Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 127, 128 (1941).9 Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585 (1906).
20 Ibid.
" Kuhlman, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28 WAsH.
U. L. Q. 221, 222 (1943).
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(2) The secondary purpose of this Chapter is to protect the
natural parents from hurried decisions, made under strain and
anxiety, to give up a child, and to protect foster parents from
assuming responsibility for a child about whose heredity or men-
tal or physicial condition they know nothing, and to prevent later
disturbance of their relationship to the child by natural parents
whose legal rights have not been fully protected.
(3) When the interests of a child and those of an adult are in
conflict, such conflict should be resolved in favor of the child;
and to that end this Chapter should be liberally construed.'
1 2
In the applicable North Carolina statutes, as in most adoption stat-
utes of other states, determination of inheritance rights is not stated
directly or impliedly as being one of the principal purposes of the
statute. Rather, consideration of inheritance rights appears in most of
the statutes as a legislative after-thought only partially completed, and
spelled out in the statutes as a by-product of providing the unfortunate
child a new home and loving care from new legal adoptive parents.
It is axiomatic.that adoption was unknown to or not recognized by
the English common law. Perhaps it is historically more accurate to
say that adoption was non-existent under the English common law.
Not until as recently as the Adoption Act of 1926 was adoption at long
last legalized in our mother country.'3 Under this Act the adoption
order did not create, change or destroy any rights of inheritance.' 4 By
this Act an adopted child did not inherit from its adoptive parents and
it was made necessary, if they desired the adoptive child to receive
their property, to make provision by will or settlemerit.' 5 On the other
hand, the first adoption statute in the United States, enacted in 1851
by Massachusetts,' 6 permitted the adopted child to inherit from the
adoptive parent.
THE NORTH CAROLINA ADOPTION STATUTES AND DECISIONS
The original adoption statute in North Carolina was passed in 1873.17
It contained basically the same provision as to inheritance rights as the
Massachusetts statute.'8  The statutory language in this respect con-
tinued in effect substantially unchanged through the North Carolina
Code of 1883, Section 3, and into the Revisal of 1905,19 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
"Such order, [granting letters of adoption] when made, shall have
the effect forthwith to establish the relation of parent and child
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §48-1 (1950). " 16 and 17 GEo. 5, c. 29 (1926).
1"Ibid., §5(2).
a 92 THE SOUCITOR'S JouRNAL 400, 401 (1948).
"' MAss. ACTs AND RESOLVES, c. 324 (1851).
17N. C. PuB. LAws c. 155 (1872-3). 1 Ibid., §3.
19 N. C. REVISAL c. 2, §176 (1905).
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between the petitioner and the child during the minority or for
the life of such child, according to the prayer of the petition,
with all the duties, powers and rights belonging to the relation-
ship of parent and child, and in case the adoption be for the life
of the child, and the petitioner die intestate, such order shall have
the further effect to enable such child to inherit the real estate
and entitle it to the personal estate of the petitioner in the same
manner and to the same extent such child would have been en-
titled to if such child had been the actual child of the person
adopting it: Provided, such child shall not so inherit and be so
entitled to the personal estate, if the petitioner specifically set
forth in his petition such to be his desire and intention.
(Italics added.)
Practically the same language was carried forward into the Con-
solidated Statutes of 1919 as c. 2, §185. The North Carolina adop-
tion statute was rewritten in 1933 but the quoted language was retained
virtually unchanged. 20 In 1935 upon revision the quoted language was
again retained.
21
In Edwards v. Yearby2 2 the question of construction of this lan-
guage was presented with regard to whether the natural or the adoptive
parent of the minor child inherited from the deceased minor adopted
child. It was held that the natural parent inherited to the exclusion of
the adoptive parent.
Later in Sorrell v. Sorrell23 an adopted child was held not entitled
to take under the after-born child provision of the wills statute. In
1935 came the case of Grimes v. Grimes.24 In construing the above
quoted language, the court held that a child adopted for life in 1924 did
not inherit that portion of the estate of his natural grandfather, who
died in 1933, which his adoptive father, who died intestate in 1931,
would have inherited as a son had he not predeceased said grandfather.
This was a clear-cut holding in effect that an adopted child did not
inherit from lineal relatives of the adoptive parent. The court empha-
sized: (1) the contractual nature of adoption; (2)" the importance of
the principle of consanguinty; and (3) the rule of strict construction
of statutes in derogation of the common law and the statutes of descent
and distribution.
20 N. C. PuB. LAWS c. 207, §1(5) (1933).
'IN. C. PuB. LAws c. 243, §1(5) (1935).
2168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19 (1915).
"3193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 356 (1927) (testator made will at time when he
had no children, leaving all to wife. Thereafter he adopted one child and another
was born to his marriage. No change was made in his will before death, held:
natural child entitled to take under after born provision of wills statute; but adoptee
though adopted for life was not entitled to inherit from the adoptive parent unless
the adoptive parent died intestate). See Note, 29 N. C. L. REV. 218 (1951).
",207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E. 574 (1935).
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It is significant to note that Ward v. Howard25 held an adopted
child not entitled to inherit from its intestate father as the adoption was
invalid because the natural mother's consent had not been obtained. It
should be noted in passing (and by way of caveat to attorneys and others
concerned most with adoption statutes) that the decisions amply show
the invalidity of adoptions not strictly complying with the statutes.
In 1941 the North Carolina adoption statute was once again re-
written. The provision with respect to inheritance rights was now
changed for the first time since its original enactment in 1873. The
new section read as follows:
48-6. "Such order granting letters of adoption shall be made
upon a standard form supplied by the state board of charities
and public welfare, and shall state whether for the minority or
for the lifetime of such child and shall have the effect forthwith
to establish the relation of parent and child between the petitioner
and the child. A child adopted for its minority shall not be
deemed a relative of its adopted parents when determining suc-
cession of property to, through or from it. But where adoptions
are for life succession by, through, and from adopted children
and their adoptive parents shall be the same as if the adopted
children were the natural, legitimate children of the adoptive
parents. Succession by children adopted for life and their lineal
descendants from or through their natural parents or by or
through the natural parents from such adopted children or their
lineal descendants shall take place only when but for such suc-
cession the state of North Carolina would succeed to the intes-
tate's property. Further, for all other purposes whatsoever a
child adopted for life and his adoptive parents shall be in the
same legal position as they would be if he had been born to his
adoptive parents. No defect or irregularity, jurisdictorial or
otherwise, in an adoption proceedings shall prevent inheritance by
a child, adopted for life, who has after the adoption continuously
lived as the adopted child of the adoptive parents.
20
However, the 1941 adoption statute added a new section which, in
applicable part, provided that:
"The provisions of §48-6 except for the last sentence shall
apply only to adoptions made after March 15, 1941 .... 127
The construction of the above-quoted sections of the 1941 statute
was presented in Phillips v. Phillips.28 In this case the plaintiff had
" 217 N. C. 291, 7 S. E. 2d 625 (1940). See also Truelove v. Parker, 191
N. C. 430, 132 S. E. 295 (1926).
-1 N. C. PuB. LAws c. 281, §4 (1941) ; see A Survey of Statutory Changes in
N. C. in 1941, 19 N. C. L. REv. 435, 449 (1941).2 7 N. C. PuB. LAws c. 281, §8 (1941).
28 227 N. C. 438, 43 S. E. 2d 604 (1947). Although decided after passage of
1947 amendments to the statutes of descent and distribution the 1941 act was
applicable because decided prior to effective date of 1947 amendments.
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been adopted by testatrix's son on February 2, 1924. Testatrix's will
was dated March 1, 1943, the plaintiff's adoptive father died November
17, 1943, and the testatrix died in 1945. It was held that plaintiff,
adopted daughter of testatrix's son, took nothing under the residual
clause of the testatrix's will giving, devising and bequeathing the re-
mainder of the estate to the testatrix's three children, share and share
alike. Thus the court held that the rights of plaintiff were to be deter-
mined by the statutes in effect prior to the 1941 Adoption Act since that
act expressly provided it should apply only to adoptions thereafter made.
Another case arising under the 1941 statute was Smyth v. Mc-
Kissick.29 The testator had died in 1942 leaving a will which created
a trust for the benefit of his son and three daughters. There was a
proviso that the "child" of any deceased child should take the part his
parent would have been entitled to if living. The son had predeceased
the testator father leaving an adopted son surviving. The testator for
four years before his death had known of, approved of, and recognized
the adoption. The court distinguished the earlier Grimes case on its
facts holding the word "child" in the will to be broad enough to include
the adopted child and that the meaning of the word "child" was not
limited to those related by blood.
In 1947 the General Assembly revised completely the adoption stat-
ute.30  The new provision with respect to inheritance rights reads as
follows:
48-23. "The final order forthwith shall establish the relation-
ship of parent and child between the petitioners and the child,
and, from the date of the signing of the final order of adoption,
the child shall be entitled to inherit real and personal property in
accordance with the statutes of descent and distribution." (N. C.
Pub. Laws 1947 c. 300.)
The 1947 Adoption Act was ratified April 4, 1947, to become effec-
tive July 1, 1947, but in an advisory opinion it was held inoperative
and void in toto for omission of the enacting clause.8 '
The 1947 General Assembly also amended the statutes of descent
and distribution by adding the following sections (ratified April 4, 1947,
and effective July 1, 1947) :
"Rule 14, Succession and inheritance rights of adopted child. An
adopted child shall be entitled by succession or inheritance to
any real property by, through, and from its adoptive parents the
same as if it were the natural, legtimate child of the adoptive
parents.
-9222 N. C. 664, 24 S. E. 2d 621 (1943).
N0 . C. PuB. LAWS c. 300 (1947); see A Survey of Statutory Changes in
N. C. in 1947, 25 N. C. L. Rzv. 376, 408-412, 443-445 (1947).
"In re Advisory Opinion, 227 N. C. 708, 43 S. E. 2d 73 (1947).
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Rule 15, Succession and inheritance rights of adoptive parents.
The adoptive parents shall be entitled by succession or inheritance
to any real property by, through, and from an adopted child the
same as if the adopted child were the natural, legitimate child of
the adoptive parents.
Rule 16, Succession and inheritance rights of legitimate children.
When any child born out of wedlock shall have been legitimated
in accordance with the provisions of G. S. 49-10 or G. S. 49-12
such child shall be entitled to all the rights of succession or in-
heritance to any real property of its father and mother as it
would have had had it been born their issue in lawful wedlock."
32
"10. An adopted child shall be entitled by succession, inheritance,
or distribution of personal property, including, without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, any recovery of damages for the
wrongful death of such adopted parent by, through and from its
adoptive parents the same as if it were the natural, legitimate
child of the adoptive parents.
11. The adoptive parents shall be entitled by succession, inheri-
tance, or distribution of personal property including, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, any recovery of damages
for the wrongful death of such adopted child by, through, and
from an adopted child the same as if the adopted child were the
natural, legitimate child of the adoptive parents.
12. When any child born out of wedlock shall have been legiti-
mated in accordance with the provisions of G. S. 49-10 or G. S.
49-12 such child shall be entitled to all the rights of succession,
inheritance, or distribution of personal property of its father and
mother as it would have had had it been born their issue in law-
ful wedlock."
33
When the 1947 Adoption Act was held inoperative and void the
amendments to the statutes of descent and distribution just quoted were
left unaccompanied by the new adoption provisions with which they were
intended to take effect simultaneously.
In 1949 a completely new adoption statute was enacted34 (effective
March 11, 1949). It was a revision of the 1947 Act. The new section
now reads:
48-23. "Effect of Final Order. The final order forthwith shall
establish the relationship of parent and child between the peti-
tioners and the child, and, from the date of the signing of the final
2N. C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(14) (15) (16) (1950). The comparison of the lan-
guage of Rule 16 and the comparable section in3fra, dealing with personalty, with
the inheritance provisions may be of some aid.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §28-149(10) (11) (12) (1950); N. C. PUB. LAWS c. 879
(1947).
"(N. C. GEr. STAT. c. 48 (1950); N. C. PuB. LAWS c. 300 (1949); see A
Sutrvey of Statutory Changes in N. C. in 1949, 27 N. C. L. REv. 405, 418 (1949).
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order of adoption, the child shall be entitled to inherit real and
personal property from the adaptive parents in accordance with
the statutes of descent and distribution." (Italics added.)
The 1949 Act, like all the earlier revisions of the adoption statute,
contained a section validating and confirming all past adoption pro-
ceedings.3 5
With enactment of the 1949 Act the statutory setting for Wil-
son v. Anderson was complete. The court stated the question before
it and the answer thus: "Do the Statutes of Descent and Distribution,
as amended by 1947 Session Laws, Chapter 832 (G. S. 29-1(14)) and
Chapter 879 (G. S. 28-149(10)), apply to an adoption made in the
year 1919 under the statute pertaining to adoptions, Chapter 2 of
Revisal of 1905, as it then existed? In the light of pertinent statutes,
and of decisions of this Court, and of rules for interpreting legislative
acts, we are of opinion and hold that this question merits a negative
answer."
36
The court stated the general rule that all adoption laws and statutes
in par materia therewith in force in a state should be read together, as
constituting one law, and the general rule that a statute should be con-
sidered in connection with other statutes affecting the same subject
matter.3 7 In accordance with the general rule that statutes are pre-
sumed to operate prospectively only,38 and in accordance with the ex-
pressly declared respect manifested by the General Assembly in each
successive adoption act for all prior adoption proceedings and judg-
ments therein, the court held, in effect, that the 1949 adoption act and
the 1947 amendments to the statutes of descent and distribution should
have a prospective effect only; i.e., would apply only to adoptions made
after these acts. In the second opinion in this case, upon dismissing a
petition to rehear, the court pointed out that:
".. . Whatever rights of succession she acquired by her adoption
became vested upon the death of her adoptive parent. [March 23,
'IN. C. GErN. STAT. §48-34 (1950): "All proceedings for the adoption of mi-
nors in courts of this state are hereby validated and confirmed and the orders and
judgments heretofore entered therein are declared to be binding upon all parties
to said proceedings and their privies and all other persons, until such orders or
judgments shall be vacated as provided by law; provided that this section shall
not apply to litigation pending on the effective date of this chapter in which the
validity of a prior adoption proceeding is involved."
361232 N. C. 213, 215, 59 S. E. 2d 836, 842 (1950).
" Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N. C. 213, 220, 59 S. E. 2d 836, 843 (1950); 26
C. J. S. 1003, 1005.
" Weber v. Griffiths, 349 Mo. 145, 159 S. W. 2d 670 (1941); McIntyre v.
Hardesty, 347 Mo. 805, 149 S. W. 2d 334 (1941); Sutton v. Davis, 205 N. C.
464, 171 S. E. 738 (1933) ; Comm'rs v. Blue, 190 N. C. 638, 130 S. E. 743 (1925) ;
Hicks v. Kearney, 189 N. C. 316, 127 S. E. 205 (1925); Rodgers v. Miller, 43
Ohio App. 198, 182 N. E. 654 (1932); Jacobs v. Duncan, 75 Okla. 71, 181 Pac.
936 (1919) ; Combs v. Cook, 35 Okla. 326, 129 Pac. 698 (1913).
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1943.] And, at that time the statute pertaining to adoption of
minors, P. L. 1941, Chapter 241, giving to an adopted child the
right to succession through the adoptive parent, applied only to
adoption made after 15 March, 1941. . ...39
Thus the North Carolina court in effect in these two opinions re-
affirms adherence to all the various bases for strict construction relied on
formerly and relied on at various times by some other courts in the
United States, namely:
1. The right to inherit property by reason of blood kinship is a
natural one while the right to inherit property created by adoption is an
artificial one.
40
2. Adoption creates a contractual status between the adoptee and the
adoptors but not as to other parties and the inheritance rights are deter-
mined by the contract and the statutes under which the contract was
made.41
3. An order of adoption is a final judgment not to be interfered with
by retroactive construction of statutes passed after the judgment.
42
4. Statutes in derogation of the established principle of consanguinity
in the law of intestate succession should be strictly construed.
43
5. A statute will not be given retroactive effect to interfere with rights
already vested or crystallized.
44
In addition to these rules of construction deducible, from the case
law, this chronological survey of the North Carolina law points up sev-
eral questions for decision facing the North Carolina court. Among
these are the following:
1. Are the inheritance rights of a child adopted after March 15, 1941,
but prior to July 1, 1947, determined under the 1941 Adoption Act or
under the 1949 Adoption Act and the 1947 amendments to the statutes
of descent and distribution?
2. Are the rights of a child adopted between July 1, 1947, and
March 11, 1949, determined under the,1941 Adoption Act or under the
"Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N. C. 521, 61 S. E. 2d 447 (1950).
"0 Phillips v. Phillips, 227 N. C. 438, 43 S. E. 2d 604 (1947); Grimes v.
Grimes, 207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E. 574 (1935); In re Matzhe's Estate, 250 Wis.
204, 26 N. W. 2d 659 (1947) ; In re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N. W.
973 (1925); Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627 (1906).
"Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 133, 136 S. W. 133 (1911) ; Weber v. Griffiths,
349 Mo. 145, 159 S. W. 2d 670 (1942) ; Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W.
585 (1906) ; In re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N. W. 973 (1925).
,2 McIntyre v. Hardesty, 347 Mo. 805, 149 S. W. 2d 334 (1941); Rodgers v.
Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N. E. 654 (1932) ; Jacobs v. Duncan, 75 Okla. 71,
181 Pac. 936 (1919); Combs v. Cook, 35 Okla. 326, 129 Pac. 698 (1913).
," Kerr v. Goldsborough, 150 Fed. 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 204 U. S. 672
(1906) ; It re Captain's Estate, 191 Okla. 463, 130 P. 2d 1002 (1942).
"Eck v. Eck, 145 S. W. 2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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1949 Adoption Act and the 1947 amendments to the statutes of descent
and distribution?
3. What are the effects as to inheritance rights provided by the
1949 Adoption Act and the 1947 amendments to the statutes of descent
and distribution, on adoptions occurring after March 11, 1949 (the
effective date of the 1949 Adoption Act) as to: (a) an adoptee; (b) an
adoptor; (c) lineal relatives of an adoptor; (d) collateral relatives of
an adoptor; (e) natural parents of an adoptee; (f) lineal relatives of
natural parents of an adoptee; (g) and collateral relatives of natural
parents of an adoptee?
4. What are the inheritance rights of a child adopted prior to July 1,
1947, but whose adoptive parent dies subsequent to that date or sub-
sequent to March 11, 1949?
5. Under the new statutes does an adopted child still inherit from
(a) its natural parents, and/or (b) their lineal relatives, and/or their
collateral relatives ?
6. What are the effects of the new statutes in construction of wills,
trust instruments and deeds as to such words as child, children, issue,
heirs, and heirs of the body?
7. What is the legal effect of the insertion of the words "from the
adoptive parents" in G. S. §48-23 in the Adoption Act of 1949?
8. What are the inheritance rights consequent to re-adoption of an
adopted child?
9. What are the effects of the 1949 Adoption Act and the 1947
amendments to the statutes of distribution with regard to personal prop-
erty in view of the long line of cases in North Carolina holding that
personal property is taken per capita and directly by virtue of the blood
relation of the distributee to the decendent and not per stirpes?
These questions (and doubtless others) will, of course, remain un-
answered until decided by cases which properly present them. The
author is bold enough to speculate on the answer to only a part of the
fifth of these questions. In Edwards v. Yearby45 it was held that the
natural rather than the adoptive parent inherited from the adopted
child. This case construed the inheritance rights provisions of the
North Carolina adoption statutes as contained in the Revisal of 1905 and
which provisions remained substantially the same from 1873 to March
15, 1941. In view of that case and since nothing is contained in the
1949 Adoption Act to cut off the right of an adopted child to inherit
from its natural parents, it would seem that a child adopted before
March 15, 1941 (effective date of the 1941 Adoption Act) or after
March 11, 1949 (effective date of the 1949 Adoption Act) could inherit
A-168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19 (1915).
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from both its adoptive parents and its natural parents. During the
eight year period that the 1941 Adoption Act was in force, that act
expressly provided that succession by or through the natural parents
from an adopted child should take place only to prevent escheat to the
state.
In considering the questions of inheritance rights yet to confront the
Supreme Court the following statutory changes are especially important:
1. The 1949 act omitted the provision in the 1941 act "that for all
other purposes whatsover the child and the adoptive parents, shall be in
the same position as they would be if the child had been born to his
adoptive parents."
2. The 1949 act omitted the provision in the 1941 act that adopted
children and their natural parents would succeed by, from and through
each other only to prevent escheat to the state.
3. The 1949 act provides for rights of inheritance being created upon
entry of the final order of adoption rather than upon entry of the inter-
locutory order as in the 1941 and earlier adoption acts.
These changes in particular as well as the complete overhauling of
the adoption act by the 1947 and 1949 General Assemblies indicate in
the writer's opinion either (a) a legislative intent that the 1949 Adoption
Act and the 1947 amendments to the statutes of descent and distribution
were to be prospective in operation in the sense that they apply only to
adoptions under (and after) the 1949 act and hence of course only to
deaths after the operative date of the 1949 act; or (b) a lack of any
real legislative intent with regard to prospective or retroactive effect on
inheritance rights consequent to adoptions.
It is noted that the 1949 Adoption Act (as well as the ill-fated
1947 Adoption Act) was materially different from the earlier acts in
many important respects. No longer is there provision for adoption
for minority of the child. The joinder of both husband and wife as
petitioners is required for an adoption (except in the case of a step-
parent where joinder of the natural parent is obviously unnecessary).
The consent of the child is required if the child is over 12 years old.
The contents of the petition for adoption, of the interlocutory decree
and of the final order are all specified in detail. The provisions relat-
ing to consent of natural parents are greatly changed, as is the entire
procedure for adoptions.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-PER CAPITA DISTRIBUTION
With regard to the ninth question raised above it should be noted
that North Carolina for nearly one hundred years since the case of
Skinner v. Wynne4" has unbrokenly followed the general rule that per-
" 55 N. C. 41 (1854).
19511
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sonal property is taken per capita and directly while real estate is
inherited per stirpes or by right of representation. Thus there is con-
siderable authority,47 as discussed briefly below, that personal property
is taken per capita and directly and by virtue of the blood relation of
the taker to the intestate decedent. It is also a general rule of con-
struction of wills where a devise or bequest is to a class collectively that
distribution is to be per capita unless the entire will discloses a contrary
intent.
In Skinner v. Wynne the intestate died leaving as distributees three
grandchildren. Two were the children of one daughter who predeceased
him and the other was the child of another daughter who also pre-
deceased him. It was held that each grandchild took one-third part
of the personalty per capita and not per stirpes. The court said, "tak-
ing per capita, in their own right, they do not account for advancements
made to their respective parents." Nelson v. Bhe 48 reaffirmed this doc-
trine in holding that under the will of a testatrix who gave "the balance
of my estate to be divided among all my lawful heirs" her numerous
nieces and nephews shared equally per capita, being in equal degree,
and under the then applicable statutes of distribution great-nieces and
great-nephews took nothing. The later case of Burton v. Cahill" applied
the principle of per capita distribution to children of joint tenants of
realty for life, who took by deed conveying to A and B for life and then
to their children, following the general rule that distribution is per
capita unless the entire will or conveyance discloses a contrary intent.8 0
Thus the statutes of distribution (with the single exception of the
wife-husband relationship) prior to the 1947 amendments have been
uniformly construed in North Carolina as at common law, i.e., pro-
viding for per capita distribution based on taking directly by virtue of
blood relationship. The General Assembly as yet has made no express
change in this rule of law. The question arises then, whether an
adoptee must establish his right to take personalty on the basis of blood
relationship to the decedent, i.e., in his own right, per capita, in which
case he would not take from a relative of the adoptive parent; or whether
the 1947 Act makes distribution to the adoptee per stirpes, in the right
of the predeceased adoptive parent ("by, through, and from"). The
7In re Mizzelle's Estate, 213 N. C. 367, 196 S. E. 364 (1938) ; Ellis v. Har-
rison, 140 N. C. 444; 53 S. E. 299 (1906). See also 2 BL. COMM. 517; 2 MINoR,
REAL PROPERTY §985 (1908); TIFFANY, REAL PROPE RTY 1913 (2d ed. 1920).
8 63 N. C. 659 (1869).
" 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926).
8 But see Walsh v. Friedman, 219 N. C. 151, 13 S. E. 2d 250 (1941) and
Knox v. Knox, 208 N. C. 141, 179 S. E. 610 (1935) as representative of will
construction cases holding that the testator had expressly shown a per stirpes
intent while recognizing the general rule that distribution is per capita unless
the entire will discloses a contrary intent.
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trial court in Wilson v,. Anderson had held that the 1947 amendments
to the statutes of descent and distribution controlled, and that the
adoptee inherited real estate, but did not take personal property as she
was not blood kin to the intestate decedent. But since the Supreme
Court held that the 1947 amendments applied prospectively only and
based its decision on this broader ground it is an open question what
the holding on this point will be when properly raised in a later case.
When this question is raised it should be remembered that the 1949
Adoption Act does not expressly make the adoptee the relative of any
one other than the adoptive parents, and that this act omitted the pro-
vision of the 1941 Adoption Act making the adoptee the child of the
adoptive parents for all other purposes as though born to the adoptive
parents.
Further, it is the writer's unoriginal observation51 that adoptive
parents (particularly those having no natural children) are generally
as much or more devoted to the adopted child than natural parents to
a natural child, but that this affection is not always shared by relatives
of the adoptive parents.
While it is true that one's blood relatives have no more control over
one's adopting a child than over one's marriage or one's having natural
children it is also true that natural children are blood kin to the natural
relatives of the natural parents and adopted children are not. If the
General Assembly, in its wisdom and as a part of its social policy for
adoptions, intends to substitute the adoptive relation for the natural
relation completely and for all purposes it is submitted that the applicable
statutes should expressly so provide. This result cannot be accomplished
where, as under existing law, an adopted child still inherits from its
natural parents and possibly from relatives of the natural parents.
The Wilson v. Anderson opinions appear to be based soundly upon
accepted rules of statutory construction. All the courts can do is apply
generally accepted rules of statutory construction until the millennium
is reached, if ever, when the statutes will give full and unambiguous
coverage.
While only the most unstinted praise can be given to the Domestic
Relations Commission and the 1947 and 1949 General Assemblies for
their fine work and substantial accomplishment in modernizing and im-
proving the Adoption Act it is clear that the courts are being and will
be called on to decide many knotty questions as to inheritance rights
consequent to adoptions unless and until some future General Assembly
fully and completely expresses its intentions by adequate statutory
coverage.
"' Being a bachelor, the writer is ex officio an authority on children, natural
and adopted, and on their proper rearing.
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Until the General Assembly speaks further it behooves those desir-
ing to leave property, real or personal, to adopted children to make
such provision by will or inter vivos gift. And it equally behooves law-
yers drafting wills and trust instruments and special conveyances to
ascertain and effectuate by careful draftsmanship the testator's or trust-
or's or grantor's specific intention as to inclusion or exclusion of adopted
children, distinguishing between those now and those thereafter adopted.
Also care should be exercised in the use of such terms as "issue,"
"child" or "children," "heirs," "heirs of the body," and "next of kin."
GENERAL LAW
With regard to the general law as to inheritance rights consequent to
adoptions any statements must be considered in the light of the funda-
mental fact that each state in the United States has its own distinctive
adoption statutes, and that the court decisions are interpreting particular
adoption statutes of one state entirely different in wording and in
statutory evolution from those in other states. In few substantive fields
of the law are there now such differences from state to state as in
adoption statutes.
There has been a gradual legislative trend in enactment of adoption
statutes to throw additional safeguards around the original taking of
a child from its natural parents, and then around the adopted child and
its adoptive parents. Also inheritance rights consequent to adoptions
are gradually being spelled out by statutes to cover some of the many
possible situations. Most state legislatures seem to make whatever pro-
visions are made as to inheritance rights a part of the adoption statutes,
while some attempt to cover the subject by amending the statutes of
descent and distribution.
The laws of foreign countries also show great variance. For ex-
ample, adoption is now provided for even in Communist Russia which
has seen the light of our capitalist ways to the small extent of providing
inheritance rights limited in amount. There, in the absence of a will,
the children, including the adopted children of a decedent, along with
his spouse, his parents if unable to work, and other persons unable to
work who have been dependent upon the decedent for at least a year
prior to his death, are madehfieirs by operation of lawY
2
The 1926 Adoption Act of England, previously mentioned, has since
been replaced by the 1949 Adoption of Children Act. Section 9(1) of
this act expresses the aim of that and the succeeding section as "secur-
ing that adopted persons are treated as children of the adoptive for the
purposes of the devolution or disposal of real and personal property."
2 Gsovski, Soviet Law of Inheritance, 45 Micir. L. REv. 291 (1947).
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The effect of the new English Act has been described as making adopted
children heirs and next of kin of the adoptive parents but not of any.
other persons.
5 3
Some states in our own country, like North Carolina, in the immedi-
ate past have been attempting to modernize their adoption acts. Ten-
nessee, for example, revised its adoption act completely in 1949.54 Sec-
tion 7 of this new act provides: ". .. such adoption shall confer upon
the child adopted . . . capacity to inherit and succeed to the real and
personal estate of such petitioner or petitioners, as heirs and next of
kin." Under the present Tennessee law apparently an adoptee would
still inherit from his natural parents but would not inherit from lineal
or collateral relatives of the adoptive parents; and a re-adoption does
not deprive the adoptee of the right to inherit from his first adoptive
parents.
55
The majority rule in the United States is that an adopted child
inherits from his adoptive parents but not through them from their
lineal or collateral relatives,56 although the majority of jurisdictions as
yet have no express statutory provisions on these questions. One sum-
mary as of 1939 shows that twenty-three states denied the right of
adopted children to inherit from lineal or collateral relatives of the
adoptive parents while eleven states granted such right.5"
A 1943 survey of the statutes of all forty-eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia demonstrates with forcefulness the differences exist-
ing in statutory coverage of inheritance rights pursuant to adoption.5
In case of the adoptor dying intestate thirty-six states permitted the
adoptee to inherit from its adoptor. In five states the right of the
adoptee to inherit depended upon the adoption decree, while in eight
states the statutes were not explicit. In nineteen states the adoptor
could inherit from the adoptee, and in fifteen the adoption rights were
determined by the source of the adoptee's estate. In North Carolina
and ten other states the statutes were deemed not explicit. Three states
had no provision and two states denied the adoptor the right to inherit.
With regard to inheritance rights between adoptee and natural
94 THE SoLIcIToR's JOURNAL 173 (1950).
TENN. PUB. Acts c. 127 (1949).
" Merlin, The Tennessee Law of Adoption, 3 VAND. L. J. 627 (1950). See
also Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482, 40 S. W. 2d 393 (1931) and earlier Ten-
nessee cases cited therein.
" RUGGLES AND REDMOND, ADOPTION AND ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN (1946).
See also 20 CALIF. L. REv. 327 (1932) discussing Estate of Pence, 67 Cal. App.
204, 4 P. 2d 202 (1931) as representative of majority view, Also see 18 VA. L.
REv. 677 (1932).
Note, 38 A. L. R. 8 (1925) and supplement in 120 A. L. R. 837 (1939).
Kuhlman, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28 WAsi.
UNIv. L. Q. 221, 227 (1943).
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parents twelve states allowed an adoptee to inherit from natural parents.
Five states denied this right, whereas thirty-two states had no explicit
provisions. On the other hand eight states refused the rights of natural
persons to inherit from adoptee while fifteen permitted the natural
parents to inherit all that the adoptee's adoptive parents or relatives
could not inherit. Three states allowed natural parents to inherit only
in the absence of adoptive relatives. Twenty-three states had no explicit
provisions.
In cases of inheritance between adoptee and adoptive lineal and
collateral relatives thirty-five states had no provision on the right of
the adoptee to inherit. Only two granted the right as to lineal and
collateral relatives. Six states allowed the adoptee to inherit from nat-
ural children of the adoptor, but made no express provision in regard to
collateral or ascendant relatives. Nine states granted lineal and col-
lateral adoptive relatives the right to inherit from the adoptee. While
twenty-two states had no explicit provision on the subject, fourteen let
the source of the adoptee's estate determine the adoptive relatives rights.
Four states permitted natural children of the adoptor to inherit from
the adoptee, but made no express provision for ascendant or collateral
relatives.
Most state statutes contain no provisions concerning inheritance
rights existing between relatives of natural parents and an adoptee in
cases of intestacy. An analysis of the foregoing summary reveals the
absence of uniformity as well as the lack in nearly all jurisdictions of
complete statutory coverage of the various possible inheritance questions.
In addition to general problems of construction and interpretation
the task of the courts is made more difficult by the necessity of con-
struing and reconciling contradictory and varying provisions in amend-
ments to adoption statutes and statutes of descent and distribution. In
other words, the courts not only have to determine the meaning of a
new statute, but also have to determine its effect in relation to earlier
statutes, and adoptions and deaths occurring prior to the latest amend-
ment. Additional problems are presented to the courts by construction
of wills, trust instruments and deeds. Moreover, the work of the courts
is made more difficult since most state courts must construe legislative
acts from their own language as there ordinarily is no recognized legis-
lative history which properly can be considered as an aid to interpreta-
tion. Indeed in construing an adoption act, a recent Wisconsin case59
held that legislative acts must be construed from their own language,
uninfluenced by what the persons introducing or preparing the bill
actually intended to accomplish by it.
"' In re Matzhe's Estate, 250 Wis. 204, 26 N. W. 2d 659 (1947).
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The majority of courts have taken a strict view, construing adoption
statutes as not broadening inheritance rights consequent to adoptions
except as expressly covered by statutory language. Most of these courts
base such strict construction on the general rule that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law should be strictly construed, and on one or
more of the bases previously enumerated. 60 On the other hand a
growing minority of courts tend to a liberal construction thereby broad-
ening inheritance rights consequent to adoptions, especially as to rights
of the adoptee.61 Yet, a study of the cases reveals that by and large
the liberal construction courts have a broader statutory basis for liberal
construction than do the strict construction courts. There is, however,
a definite current legislative trend to modernize and improve adoption
statutes and to clarify and generally enlarge inheritance rights conse-
quent to adoption.
Many of the statutes do not. expressly clarify the effect of amend-
ments relating to inheritance rights upon pre-existing adoptions. Since
in most of the states inheritance rights consequent to adoption are pro-
vided for in the adoption act rather than in the statutes of descent and
distribution it is difficult for courts to determine whether amendments
relating to inheritance rights were intended to be prospective or retro-
active in effect. This in turn raises the question whether the law in
effect at date of adoption or at date of death of a decedent should govern.
While the general rule is that inheritance rights are determined by the
law in effect at the time of death, this rule is subject to modification by
the rule of construction that as to adoptions the adoption act and all
statutes in pari naterii therewith must be construed together. When
so applied and with the application of other well accepted rules of
statutory construction, courts very logically can and do reach decisions,
as in Wilson v. Anderson, that amendments broadening or changing
inheritance rights consequent to adoptions are prospective only in opera-
tion and do not apply to adoptions occurring prior to the amendments.
Furthermore a number of problems of conflict of laws are raised by
the differences from state to state in adoption statutes and inheritance
consequent to adoptions but these problems are outside the scope of this
article.
" See p. 235.
" E.g., In re Rieman's Estate, 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16 (1927); Kolb v.
Ruhl's Adm'r., 303 Ky. 604, 198 S. W. 2d 326 (1946) (child adopted under 1930
act entitled to inherit through adoptive parents under 1940 adoption act) ; In re
Cave's Estate, 326 Pa. 358, 192 At. 460 (1937); Fulcher v. Carter, 212 S. W.
2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); In re Waddell's Estate, 131 Wash. 566, 230 Pac.
822 (1924).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Those who seek to extend the scope of the statutes beyond their
express language, under the guise of liberal construction, are in reality
pursuing the dangerous gospel of judicial legislation. Those who favor
liberalization (as well as those who oppose liberalization but desire
clarity and certainty), rather than being critical of the courts for apply-
ing well settled rules of statutory construction should give constructive
help to state legislatures by way of suggestion, study and drafting of
statutes which effectuate whatever (liberal or strict) the legislative
policy may be.
There is a decided national trend to modernize adoption statutes. It
is to be hoped that the various legislatures as a part of this movement
can enact legislation adequately covering, in unambiguous language, the
various possibilities. The legislatures and not the courts should deter-
mine to what extent and in what manner these inheritance rights should
be changed or broadened. Such statutes should also state in unequivocal
language the precise coverage of the statutes with regard to (1) parties
affected and (2) whether or not prospective or retroactive application
is intended.
Perhaps there is a need for general legislative revision, moderniza-
tion and clarification of statutes of descent and distribution to meet
present changed social and economic conditions. Indubitably there is at
least a need in every state for more adequate statutory coverage of
inheritance rights consequent to adoptions. This does not imply a need
for uniformity. Until the legislatures of the nation respond to this
need by appropriate legislation clearly and fully showing their intent the
courts will be compelled to decide difficult questions. For the imme-
diate future differences in decisions reasonably can be expected, because
of the great diversity and the incompleteness of the statutes being
construed.
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